The Environmental Review Tribunal’s action might prove contagious. It’s unclear why the IESO is not exercising contract clause’s to revoke other feed-in tariff (FIT) contracts. I reviewed FIT 1 contracts and found this:
TERMINATION AND DEFAULT…
9.1 Events of Default by the Supplier
(j) The Commercial Operation Date has not occurred on or before the date which is 18 months after the Milestone Date for Commercial Operation, or otherwise as may be set out in Exhibit A.
So I checked my import of data from an IESO contract data listing (should match this). Aside from the Fairview site just cancelled, the off-shore contract persists despite a ban on offshore. The Amherst Island project has advanced to the stage of barge sinking in harbour – but not far beyond that, while White Pines was greatly reduced by the ERT yet ponders a future despite having run out the clock.
What’s in Exhibit A of these deals preventing the IESO from terminating?
On July 26th Alberta’s electricity market hit its regulated peak price of $1000 per megawatt-hour (MWh) and stayed there for hours 17, 18 and 19. The price soon dropped back down but the commentary continues.
Upon seeing there had been a price spike, I checked to how industrial wind turbines had performed and saw they’d performed exactly as I’d expected, with output dropping from hour 14 to hour 18.
I expected that as I’d seen it in 2014 and in 2012. I didn’t think this was a particularly big event. Prices have been very low in Alberta and this spike will do little to change the yearly average. Alberta is examining a capacity market, and the intent of those is to prevent high price hours – but Texas is an example of a jurisdiction thus far avoiding capacity markets/costs by upping the maximum peak market price. Theoretically, peak pricing can be healthy in encouraging new market entrants with peaking generation, or demand reduction, products. While seeing the one event as not particularly problematic, I did put some short thoughts up on twitter:
capacity credit of industrial wind turbines in Alberta is ~nil 30% renewable goal is 100% wrong-headed get the backbone clean 1st
Capacity credit is an awkward term I’ll return to.
A response to my tweet tagged Andrew Leach who later put some other suspects for the cost spike up on Twitter, including:
If you look at what pulled out of the market, you had BR5 and Milner out, and then one Keephills and one Sundance coal unit exit…
And, on top of having those 4 coal units out, two more ramped down and wind generation dropped…
As @JesseJenkins often points out, we need to re-think “base load” – AB had at least 6 “base load” coal plants out during summer peak.
“two more ramped down and wind generation dropped” is interesting. I’ll simply point to a recent post on flexibility as speculation on that point.
I rudely responded to the last point – which is the point the dreadful Pembina Institute now has a blog post picking up on.
So now I feel I must address the silly commentary from the time, and money, wasting Pembina and associates crowd.
In early 2010, then Minister of Energy Brad Duguid issued a directive to the OPA (Ontario Power Authority) instructing them to create and deliver an “industrial energy efficiency program” specifically for large transmission connected (TX) ratepayers.
That directive led to the creation of the two classes of ratepayers that now exist in Ontario.
If you are unfamiliar with the topic the latest article may inspire you to learn more, I recommend some articles for doing so at the end of this short post.
One statement Parker makes is not entirely correct: “IESO did not start disclosing the consumption by ratepayer class until 2015.” While they did not publish the data to their website, they did share it with those who asked.
My Finnish readers will already know that I announced some time ago that I’m done with energy/climate change discussions. I’ve been following the debate actively since about 2007 and have been writing about it since late 2010. I’ve written two books about the topic, one of which is translated to five languages, and blogged fairly regularly. But now it’s time to do something else.
The main reason why I’m refocusing is because I think the debate is going nowhere, and I don’t want to waste my time on a futile project. We are not going to get a decarbonized energy system by 2050. We are going to fail the climate targets, probably by a large margin, and I suspect that a warming of about 3 degrees centigrade is going to be almost inevitable. It’s perfectly possible that self-amplifying feedback mechanisms under way will amplify this change even more. What…
There’s an Ontario Energy Report (OER) that drips out quarterly.
It’s often got a mistake on the first page. Half of that page is static graphics. The other half is some simple data presented in big fonts.
The report could be useful as it contains data that is difficult to find elsewhere. The intent when it started, as I understood it, was to bring data from multiple sources together in a coherent fashion. I suspect it was supposed to be definitive – to avoid people getting information from rogue sources such as Parker Gallant and I. The official data would be a good thing if it were credible – but the first page often reveals it is not.
This quarter the very first data set – the “Transmission Grid-Connected Generation Output (Q1)” – has errors.
Ontario’s use of gas in generation electricity during the first quarter was very low. It was lower than it’s been in over 50 years. But it wasn’t this low.
Some numbers I’ve compiled for the most recent periods of Ontario electricity consumption.
IESO weekly reports run from Wednesday to Tuesday – presumably because the market opened on Wednesday May 1st, 2002.
1 The week beginning on the 20th Wednesday of 2017, May 17-23, 2017, is the first one where the average Hourly Ontario Energy Price (HOEP), weighted to the system operator’s “Ontario Demand”, was negative.
On average, it cost money to give away electricity
“This” involved something about the value of wind, and what could be done to contain it.
I’ve written a lot on this in the past, and won’t do so again here except to explain the graph that accompanies this post – which explains what can be done to increase the value of the 20-year contracts Ontario’s thug Premier claims will have ongoing value.
It also explains why wind won’t, in the near future, be part of a near-zero emission electricity system anywhere not blessed with large hydro reservoirs.